St. John's University School of Law

St. John's Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
2021

When Public Defenders and Prosecutors Plea Bargain Race – A
More Truthful Narrative
Elayne E. Greenberg
St. John's University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law and Race Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

When Public Defenders and Prosecutors Plea Bargain Race – A
More Truthful Narrative
PROFESSOR ELAYNE E. GREENBERG*
“Change will not come if we wait for some other person or some other
time. We are the ones we’ve been waiting for. We are the change that we
seek.”
Barack Obama1
I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper challenges prevailing stereotypes about public defenders and
prosecutors and updates those stereotypes with a more accurate narrative
about how reform-minded public defenders and prosecutors can plea bargain
race to yield more equitable justice outcomes.2
I was invited to the discussion about criminal justice reform in plea
bargaining, because of my work in dispute resolution, dispute system design,
and discrimination.3 Plea bargaining is a justice system negotiation that is
used in upwards of 97% of criminal case dispositions.4 Unlike many of my
colleagues in criminal justice reform who have also had years of experience
working in the criminal justice system, I have little experience in the criminal
justice system.5 Thus, I approached this work with a beginner’s mind.
With this fresh perspective, I was struck by the biases that existed toward
public defenders and prosecutors.6 Public defenders are basically good
*

Professor Greenberg is Assistant Dean of Dispute Resolution, Professor of Legal Practice and Faculty
Advisor of the Carey Center for Dispute Resolution at St. John’s Law School. This paper is the written
elaboration of the remarks she made at the 44th Annual Ohio Northern University Law Review
Symposium, “The Impact of Race on a Criminal Case,” held virtually on March 19, 2021. My appreciation
to Professor Anna Roberts for her initial research guidance. My thanks to Danielle Marino ‘21 and
Matthew Sulewski ‘22 for their research and editing assistance.
1. President Barack Obama, Night of Super Tuesday Speech (Feb. 5, 2008) (found at
obamaspeeches.com/E02-Barack-Obama-Super-Tuesday-Chicago-IL-February-5-2008.htm).
2. See infra Part IV.A-B.
3. See, e.g., Elayne E. Greenberg, Unshackling Plea Bargaining from Racial Bias, 111 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93 (2021).
4. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 3, 14 (2018) (found
at www.nacdl.org/trialpenaltyreport).
5. See Elayne E. Greenberg, ST. JOHN’S UNIV. SCH. L., https://www.stjohns.edu/law/faculty/ela
yne-e-greenberg.
6. See infra Part II.
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people who are overworked and rendered incompetent by their
unmanageable caseloads.7 Prosecutors wield unfettered discretion solely to
advance their conviction rates, not to achieve just outcomes.8 Unspoken, but
lived, a disproportionate number of Black defendants are the casualties of
these biases.9 Ironically, I also couldn’t help but observe how even some of
the most respected criminal justice scholars who have devoted have their
careers to ending biased justice outcomes, acknowledged their own long-held
biases about public defenders and prosecutors based on their personal work
experiences in the criminal justice system.10
These biases are so entrenched in our worldviews that they made their
way into the 2020 Democratic presidential debates.11 When voters were
trying to assess each presidential candidates’ biases toward criminal justice
reforms, as one measure, voters took note of who had served as a prosecutor
and who served as a public defender.12 During the debate, President Biden
proudly stated that he left work at a large law firm and chose instead to work
as a public defender.13 Vice President Harris talked about what she had
accomplished as a prosecutor.14 We know what inferences were drawn based
on the criminal justice role each candidate had chosen.15
A distorting consequence of these stereotypes is that public defenders and
prosecutors, the primary legal actors in plea bargaining, are held responsible

7. Ed Lyon, Appointed Defense Lawyers, Public Defenders Overworked, Underpaid, Ineffective,
CRIM. LEGAL NEWS (MAY 15, 2019) (https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2019/may/15/appointed-d
efense-lawyers-public-defenders-overworked-underpaid-ineffective/). See also Ofra Bikel, The Plea
Introduction, PBS: FRONTLINE (June 17, 2004), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/etc
/synopsis.html (describing the ineffectiveness of public defenders and the abuse of power by prosecutors
leading to innocent people to plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain).
8. Stuart Diamond, The Law; Prosecutorial Discretion Worthy of Defense?, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1988, at B20, found at https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/22/us/the-law-prosecutorial-discretion-wort
hy-of-defense.html (describing how the ineffectiveness of public defenders and the abuse of power of
prosecutors causes innocent people to plead guilty).
9. Elizabeth Hinton, et al., An Unjust Burden The Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in
the Criminal Justice System, VERA: INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (2018), found at www.vera.org/for-the-recor
d-unjust-burden; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Report of The Sentencing Project to the United Nations
Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance 2 (2018), found at
https://www.se ntencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/ [hereinafter “Report to
the United Nations”].
10. See, e.g., Maybell Romero, Rural Spaces, Communities of Color, and the Progressive
Prosecutor, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 818 (2020).
11. Grullón Paz, Kamala Harris and Joe Biden Clash on Race and Busing, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/politics/kamala-harris-joe-biden-busing.html.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. See also Reginald Dwayne Betts, Kamala Harris, Mass Incarceration and Me, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/20/magazine/kamala-harris-crime-prison.html.
(“Harris argued that the ongoing struggle for equality needed to include both prosecuting criminal
defendants who had victimized Black people and protecting the rights of Black criminal defendants.”).
15. Paz, supra note 11.
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for the disparate justice outcomes when they plea bargain race.16 They are
blamed for the historical branding of Black defendants as dangerous
criminals.17 They are blamed for the fact that African Americans are 5.9
times more likely than their white counterparts to be incarcerated.18 They are
blamed for the fact that eighteen and nineteen year old Black males are 12
times more likely to be imprisoned than their white counterparts.19 They are
held responsible for the disparate number of Black defendants who receive
longer sentences compared to their white counterparts accused of similar
crimes,20 the disparate number of Black defendants who plead guilty even
when they are innocent21 and the disparate number of Black defendants who
are sentenced as adults even when they are teenagers.22
These legal actors are blamed for perpetuating a retributive justice system
that focuses on punishment, rather than rehabilitation of Black defendants.23
Prosecutors and public defenders are blamed for a retributive justice system
that punishes the crime at hand rather than addressing the systemic racist
etiology that causes the crime.24 And, they are blamed for a retributive system
that views crime as a state-centered response often at the exclusion of the
community and victim concerns.25

16. See, e.g., Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2364-35 (2013) (elaborating on the concept of “defender triage”); Alexander
Testa & Brian D. Johnson, Paying the Trial Tax Race, Guilty Pleas, and Disparity in Prosecution, 31
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 500, 503 (2020) (discussing the different considerations employed by prosecutors
and public defenders when plea bargaining).
17. Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishmnet Racial Perceptions of Crime and Support for
Punitive Policies, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publicati
ons/race-and-punishment-racial-perceptions-of-crime-and-su pport-for-punitive-policies/.
18. Report to the United Nations, supra note 9, at 6-7.
19. Jennifer Bronson & E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2017, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 15
(2019), found at https://perma.cc/GW6C-KAW7.
20. Id.at 9.
21. Samuel R. Gross, et al., Race and Wrongful Convictions in the United States, NATIONAL
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 1 (2017). See also Daniele Selby, 8 Facts You Should Know About Racial
Injustice in the Criminal Legal System, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Feb. 5, 2021), https://innocenceproject.org/f
acts-racial-discrimination-justice-system-wrongful-conviction-black-history-month/ (highlighting that
half of people exonerated since 1989 are Black).
22. See, e.g., Sarah Gonzalez, Kids in Prison Getting Tried as An Adult Depends on Skin Color,
WNYC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.wnyc.org/story/black-kids-more-likely-be-tried-adults-cantbe-explained/ (stating that in New Jersey, nearly 700 minors were tried as adults during a five year period,
and nearly 90% were Black or Latino).
23. See, e.g., FANIA E. DAVIS, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RACE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 64 (2019).
24. See, e.g., id. See also Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Tali Gal, Restorative Criminal Justice, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2316-17, 2319-20 (2013) (“Adjudication becomes unnecessary in many cases,
when the parties agree to a plea bargain.”); Bruce A. Green & Lara Bazelon, Restorative Justice From
Prosecutors’ Perspective, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2287, 2296-97 (2020) (describing prosecutors’
predisposition to disliking a restorative justice process).
25. See Davis, supra note 23, at 67; Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, at 2317-19 (In
punitive justice systems, “[t]he role of the sovereign is to regulate behavior, and in doing so, to determine
guilt and punishment.”); Green & Bazelon, supra note 24, at 2297 (“Unless the prosecutor has received
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Another disabling consequence of these stereotypes is that public
defenders and prosecutors are publicly cast as enemies, expressing scorn for
the other and the roles they represent.26 Negotiation scholars teach us that
such an adversarial and polarizing stance is toxic in plea negotiations,
especially when justice is at stake.27 Instead, a more collaborative, problemsolving mindset is more likely to yield a responsive and equitable justice
outcome.28
While some of the stereotypes about public defenders and prosecutors
may have represented the status quo at an earlier time and may still hold some
truth, these biases are frozen in time.29 They obscure a growing trend in
which many public defenders and prosecutors are now actually criminal
justice reform activists.30 These stereotypes of prosecutors and public
defenders omit how public defenders and prosecutors are now incentivized to
help reform racialized criminal justice outcomes in plea bargaining race,31
and they omit what affirmative steps can be taken to mitigate the problem32.
This paper refocuses the plea bargaining race discussion on a more
truthful narrative about how public defenders and prosecutors are changing
how they plea bargain race to yield more racially justice outcomes.33 This
more accurate narrative describes how public defenders and prosecutors are
expanding the plea bargaining process from a solely retributive focus to
include a restorative focus.34 This restorative focus looks at the Black
defendant as a human being who should take responsibility for any crimes
committed, and be rehabilitated, not punished.35 A restorative justice focus
state or private funding to support a restorative justice program, as some have, such a program may not
seem feasible even if the prosecutor is enthusiastic.”).
26. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Good Person, Good Prosecutor in 2018, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 3, 3-4
(2018) (stating that from a public defender’s perspective, choosing to become a prosecutor is a “moral
choice” which requires one to choose to lock people up as part of the United States’ “shameful system.”).
27. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES (3rd ed. 2011); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, ET
AL., BEYOND WINNING (2nd ed. 2000); WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO (1991).
28. See, e.g., Fisher et al., supra note 27; Mnookin, supra note 27; Ury, supra note 27.
29. See, e.g., George Joseph, He Spent 24 Years Behind Bars Because Queens Prosecutors Broke
the Rules. Was This Their Only Wrongful Conviction?, GOTHAMIST (Apr. 5, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://gothamist.com/news/he-spent-24-years-behind-bars-because-queens-prosecutors-broke-ruleswas-their-only-wrongful-conviction; David Leonhardt, Two Men, Two Decades, No Evidence, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/16/briefing/winter-storm-adam-kinzinger-pelosicongress.html; Jan Ransom & Ashley Southall, Prosecutors Sometimes Behave Badly. Now They May Be
Held to Account., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/nyregion/ny-prosecut
ors-cuomo.html.
30. See infra Part III.A.
31. See infra Part IV.A.
32. See infra Part IV.B.
33. See infra Part IV.A-B.
34. See infra Part III.B-C.
35. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 23, at 69; Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, at 2317-19 (In
punitive justice systems, “[t]he role of the sovereign is to regulate behavior, and in doing so, to determine
guilt and punishment.”); Green & Bazelon, supra note 24, at 2297 (“Unless the prosecutor has received
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encourages public defenders and prosecutors to take a more holistic
perspective on crime etiology and include the community, the victim and the
defendant to consider more responsive justice options for case disposition.36
This restorative focus mobilizes the resources of the community and concerns
of the victim to help shape a responsive justice process.37 Additionally, a
restorative justice focus helps mitigate the systemic racism in the criminal
justice system.
This more truthful narrative describes how prosecutors and public
defenders are shifting from working combatively against each other to
working collaboratively to help mitigate the disparate racial justice outcomes
that occur in plea bargaining.38 Also, it highlights how emerging plea
bargaining scholarship encourages public defenders and prosecutors to apply
negotiation theory and skills in the plea bargaining process that will help to
mitigate racially disparate pleas.39
My focus is on plea bargaining, because plea bargaining is the decision
hub in which upwards of 97% of criminal cases receive justice dispensation.40
Moreover, plea bargaining is the process in which motivated public defenders
and prosecutors have the power to discount racially compromised policing
and replace it with more racially neutral information that will help decide
more equitable justice outcomes.41 The immediate goal is to strengthen the
individual negotiation and collaborative skills of public defenders and
prosecutors when they plea bargain race to promote fairer and less racialized
justice outcomes in plea bargaining.42

state or private funding to support a restorative justice program, as some have, such a program may not
seem feasible even if the prosecutor is enthusiastic.”).
36. See Davis, supra note 23, at 69-71; Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, at 2316, 2318
(“The criticism of [a punitive] criminal justice system [is] related both to its ineffectiveness in reducing
criminality and to its failure to address victims’ needs.”); Green & Bazelon, supra note 24, at 2299-2300
(discussing the pros and cons of a restorative justice approach to prosecution).
37. See Davis, supra note 23, at 71-72; Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, at 2318 (stating
that the purpose of a restorative justice system is to have input from the victims and the community); Green
& Bazelon, supra note 24, at 2305 (“[R]estorative justice processes ar by their nature individualized,
community-oriented, and victim-centered.”).
38. Davis, supra note 23, 71-72.
39. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ALKON & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME (2019)
(recommending how to incorporate negotiating skills into the plea bargaining process); Greenberg, supra
note 3, at 131-37 (describing how to develop an organizational structure and specific negotiation skills
that will yield more racially equitable plea bargaining outcomes); Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright,
Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY 1445, 1471-72 (2016) (urging for public defenders to receive
training in negotiation theory and skills); Ronald F. Wright et al., The Shadow Bargainers, CARDOZO L.
REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 20-21) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3577322
#) (surveying public defenders’ mindsets and actual practices when plea bargaining).
40. Guilty Pleas on the Rise, Criminal Trials on the Decline, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-on-the-rise-criminal-trials-on-the-decline/.
41. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 139-40.
42. Id. at 134-36.
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This discussion will continue in four parts. In the first section, I discuss
why the prosecutors and public defenders need to change how they plea
bargain race.43 The second section describes how the common practice of
plea bargaining race, ignores the lessons of cognitive behavioral
psychologists and negotiation scholars and yields racially disparate justice
outcomes.44 In the third section, I spotlight how progressive prosecutors are
changing the plea bargaining race status quo.45 Contrary to the stereotypes
about prosecutors, I report how progressive prosecutors are using their broad
discretionary power to implement criminal justice reform.46 As part of this
reform, they are working with public defenders to expand the plea bargaining
culture from one that has a retributive focus to one that also considers
restorative justice practices.47 As part of this discussion I showcase the
initiatives of Fair and Just Prosecution, a network of progressive
prosecutors.48 I then shift the focus to public defenders and discuss the
specific negotiation skills that public defenders can use to plea bargain race.49
I also extrapolate lessons from two groundbreaking scholarships on plea
bargaining race: The Shadow Bargainers50 and Unshackling Plea Bargaining
From Racial Bias.51 The final section concludes with an updated narrative of
how public defenders and prosecutors can plea bargain to mitigate racially
disparate justice outcomes.
II.
PLEA BARGAINING RACE AS PRACTICED YIELDS RACIALLY
DISPARATE OUTCOMES
In this section, I explain how the plea bargaining process, as traditionally
practiced by the stereotypical public defender and prosecutor, is likely to
yield racially disparate justice outcomes. The speed of the process,52 the

43. See infra Part II.
44. See infra Part III.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 23, at 94-95; Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, at 2335-36
(“[S]ymbolic reparation can indeed occur within our criminal law system once we understand restorative
justice as part of it.”); Green & Bazelon, supra note 24, at 2313 (“[P]roponents must argue that restorative
justice serves the public consistently with conventional criminal justice philosophies, policies, objectives,
and principles.”).
48. About FJP Our Work and Vision, FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION, https://fairandjustprosecution.o
rg/about-fjp/our-work-and-vision/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2021) [hereinafter “About FJP”].
49. See infra Part IV.B.
50. Wright et al., supra note 39, at 1.
51. Greenberg, supra 3, at 94.
52. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 86-87 (2011) (explaining how System I
thinking, also known as fast, unconscious thinking, allows implicit biases to emerge).
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unfettered discretion of the prosecutor,53 and the retributive focus54 coalesce
to create a justice negotiation that is compromised by racial bias.
Furthermore, the positional posture of plea negotiations in which public
defenders and prosecutors maintain a narrow focus on retributive justice
precludes any meaningful discussion about what would be an appropriate and
responsive justice outcome for that defendant.55
A. Traditional Plea Bargaining Practice56
A common plea bargaining scene: A public defender and a prosecutor,
both assigned to the same case, meet by happenstance in a busy courthouse
corridor.57 Even though neither prosecutor or public defender has spent much
time preparing for this negotiation, they still decide to seize the moment,
check one more item off their “to do” list and plea bargain the case.58
Together they seek refuge in a corner of the corridor and throw out possible
pleas and prison sentences, framed within the contours of what the prosecutor
is willing to consider a just resolution.59 This negotiation may take place in
under five minutes.
B. Cognitive Behavior Psychologists: The Plea Bargaining Structure Is
Conducive to Allowing Prosecutors’ and Public Defenders’ Implicit
Racial Biases to Emerge
Cognitive behavioral psychologists teach that our implicit biases are
more likely to emerge and influence our decision making when we are
required to make fast decisions and when we have broad discretion, rather
than a defined structure, about how to make that decision.60 Thus, “[t]he
speed of the plea bargaining process itself makes it more likely that the
implicit racial biases” of public defenders and prosecutors may emerge and
further prejudice the plea negotiation.61 Moreover, the broad discretion of the
prosecutor to decide the appropriate contours of the plea and sentence make
53. Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 795, 805 (2012) (describing how prosecutors’ unfettered
power leads to implicit bias at every phase of a criminal case).
54. Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, 2317 (In a retributive justice system, “[p]unishment
is proportional to the severity of the crime and is influenced by mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.”).
55. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 130.
56. Most cases are “settled through plea bargains in which a defendant agrees to plead guilty in
exchange for a reduced sentence.” Bikel, supra note 7.
57. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 122.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 127.
61. Id. at 94.
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it more likely that the prosecutor’s implicit racial bias will emerge and
demand more punitive and harsher sentences for Black defendants.62
Consequently, the speed and lack of procedural structure in plea bargaining
make it more likely that the implicit racial biases of the public defenders and
prosecutors will contaminate the plea bargaining process.63
C. Retributive Justice Focus Narrows the Justice Options
For the most part, the plea bargaining focus maintains a narrow focus on
retributive justice: what is the appropriate amount of prison time a defendant
should serve for the crime committed? Retributive justice focuses on
punishment at the exclusion of rehabilitation.64 This narrow focus precludes
a broader understanding of why, if at all, the defendant committed the crime,
and what are possible responsive options for the defendant to acknowledge
and take responsibility for the crime committed.65 Moreover, since
retributive justice is doled out by the state, there is no meaningful input from
the community or the victim.66 Thus, the focus on retributive justice in plea
bargaining race narrows the possible value added that could be had if plea
bargaining race was expanded to include a restorative justice focus.67
D. Negotiation Scholars: Plea Bargaining As Practiced Ignores Good
Negotiation Practice
Plea bargaining scholars have called out to prosecutors and public
defenders to heed the lessons taught by negotiation scholars and integrate the
lessons into their plea bargaining process.68 As one lesson, renowned
negotiation scholar William Ury states that in effective negotiations, it is vital
to “go slow to go fast.”69 In other words, plea bargaining race, as in all
negotiations, requires a slower, more deliberate process to achieve a more
equitable justice outcome.70 As part of a slower negotiation process, public
defenders and prosecutors must prepare for the negotiation.71 Part of that
62. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 129-30.
63. Id. at 130.
64. Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, 2317-18.
65. Id. at 2320-21.
66. Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, at 2320 (describing that a restorative justice system,
unlike a retributive justice system, requires input from the offender and the victim in order to be effective).
67. Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, at 2320-21 (discussing the benefits of a restorative
justice approach to criminal punishment).
68. See, e.g., Alkon & Schneider, supra note 39; Roberts & Wright, supra note 39, at 1471-72
(“[S]tudies about the effectiveness of using particular elements from negotiation theory more generally
support the claim that training matters.”).
69. Ury, supra note 27, at 187.
70. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 127 (recommending plea bargainers slow down the negotiation
process in order to “manage implicit biases.”).
71. Ury, supra note 27, at 15.
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preparation for plea bargaining race includes figuring out each side’s
prioritized interests,72 considering viable options,73 using objective standards
to help select an option,74 and identifying the best alternative to a negotiated
agreement if your plea bargaining fails.75 It is important to note that racial
bias, like any bias, contributes to making plea bargaining a subjective process
swayed by the preferences of the negotiators, the public defenders, and
prosecutors.76 Therefore, objective data about the ultimate sentences
received by other similarly situated white defendants will help keep the race
plea bargaining process a fairer process in which Black defendants do not
receive harsher sentences than their white counterparts who committed a
similar crime.77
Negotiation scholars also advise how to shift the traditional in person plea
bargaining process from a positional one in which public defenders and
prosecutors trade charges and sentences back and forth to an interest-based
negotiation in which public defenders and prosecutor share information and
problem-solve to arrive at an equitable and responsive justice resolution
rather than just going back and forth about acceptable charges and
sentences.78 Rather than have a case be just one more file to dispense with
among an overflowing pile of case files, together the public defender and
prosecutor should meet to consider the justice options for a particular case.79
A central distinction in an interest-based negotiation is that the prosecutor
and public defender share information.80 According to an interest-based plea
bargaining process, the prosecutor readily shares all evidence, including
exculpatory evidence, with the goal of working with the public defender to
arrive at an equitable resolution.81 A public defender participating in an
interest-based plea bargaining shares information about the defendant that
helps humanize the defendant, explain any extenuating circumstances, and
contribute to the public defender’s independent investigation. Together the
prosecutor and public defender consider what is a just, equitable resolution
for each defendant, given the particular circumstances of their case.

72. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id. at 20.
75. Id. at 22.
76. Wright et al., supra note 39, at 23.
77. Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Cynthia Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark The Need for
Transparency and Data in Plea Bargaining, 22 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 434, 457 (2019).
78. Fisher et al., supra note 28 (explaining how to focus on interests, not positions); Mnookin et
al., supra note 28; Ury, supra note 27, at 11 (discussing how to manage the tension between creating and
distributing value by sharing information).
79. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 127-29.
80. Id. at 139-40.
81. Id.
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How likely is it that public defenders and prosecutors actually implement
these plea bargaining changes? The remainder of the paper will discuss how
these changes are being implemented and how progressive prosecutors are
creating reform in the criminal justice culture that incentivize prosecutors and
public defenders to implement these plea bargaining process changes.
III.
PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS ARE CHANGING THE PLEA
BARGAINING RACE CULTURE
In this section, I report on a new breed of prosecutors, Progressive
Prosecutors,82 and highlight the work of Fair and Just Prosecution, a network
of progressive prosecutors.83 Progressive prosecutors, as the label connotes,
opt to use, rather than misuse, their broad prosecutorial powers to enact
criminal justice reform measures designed to mitigate racially disparate
justice outcomes. In their role, progressive prosecutors develop policies,
implement procedures and follow-through with practices that yield raceneutral and just outcomes.84 These prosecutors keep data about their efforts
to ensure that their outcome is consistent with their intent, and when it isn’t,
to take corrective measures.85 Progressive prosecutors have created
Conviction Integrity Units (CIUs) to help correct the wrongs of past
prosecutorial conduct by reinvestigating past cases in which there may have
been abuse that may have resulted in “wrongful convictions or injustice.”86
Progressive Prosecutors are also rethinking how they might integrate a
more restorative justice approach in appropriate cases to ameliorate past
injustices.87 After all, these prosecutors consider it their obligation to decide
whether referring defendants to diversion programs or seeking appropriate
justice by not requesting the maximum sentence is more appropriate than the
traditional prosecutorial process.88

82. See EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 159 (2019) (“[A]s long as we have an adversarial system,
we will be in urgent need or prosecutors who are committed to social and racial justice.”); Angela J. Davis,
Reimagining Prosecution A Growing Progressive Movement, 3 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 1 (2019) (“In
recent years, some elected prosecutors have sought to . . . [use] their power and discretion with the goals
of . . . reducing mass incarceration, eliminating racial disparities, and seeking justice for all.”).
83. About FJP, supra note 48.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Conviction Integrity Unit Best Practices, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.in
nocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Conviction-Integrity-Unit.pdf.
87. Green & Bazelon, supra note 24, at 2287 (describing prosecutors’ predisposition to disliking a
restorative justice process).
88. Id.
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A. Fair and Just Prosecution (FJP)
Founded in 2017, FJP is a national network of newly-elected
prosecutors, who are using their prosecutorial powers to enact criminal justice
reform.89 Miriam Krinsky, the Executive Director of Fair and Just
Prosecution, explains that the organization is founded on a “different vision
of a justice system, one that is grounded in principles of fairness, equity and
compassion.”90 These organizational principles are brought to life through
mentoring, educational resources, and collaborative justice reform projects.91
Together, this network is creating a criminal justice culture shift in which
progressive prosecutors are using their broad powers to produce equitable
justice outcomes.92
FJP has three projects of note—the Justice Collaborative, 55
Prosecutorial Performance Indicators, and Restorative Justice Issues at a
Glance.93 These projects change the criminal justice reform conversation
about prosecutorial misconduct from a conversation about “what’s wrong
with prosecutors” to a conversation about “what and how prosecutors can do”
to remedy these wrongs. 94 Moreover, FJP’s projects provide a strategic map
of affirmative steps progressive prosecutors can take to foster a more
equitable justice system.95 Consequently, these initiatives are creating a more
responsive and less racially disparate plea bargaining culture in which public
defenders and prosecutors plea bargain race.96
B. FJP 21 Principles for the 21st Century Prosecutor
FJP co-authored “21 Principles for the 21st Century Prosecutor,” a
guidebook that outlines affirmative steps to help progressive prosecutors
enact their vision of criminal justice outcomes that “reduce incarceration,”
“increase fairness,” and strengthen the health of communities.97 The
handbook was produced in collaboration with the Brennan Center of Justice
and the Justice Collaborative.98 Reading the twenty-one principles is like a
criminal justice reformer’s dream list for Santa. The handbook discusses how
89. News Voices of Change, FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION, https://fairandjustprosecution.org/news/
voices-of-change/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) [hereinafter “Voices of Change”].
90. Fair & Just Prosecution, The New Normal 21st Century Prosecutors Building a Fair and Just
Future, VIMEO (May 1, 2019), https://vimeo.com/333604917.
91. About FJP, supra note 48.
92. Id.
93. FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION, https://fairandjustprosecution.org/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2021).
94. About FJP, supra note 48.
95. Id.
96. Voices of Change, supra note 89.
97. See generally Fair & Just Prosecution, 21 Principles for the 21st Century Prosecutor (2018)
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_21st_century_prosecutor.pdf.
98. Id. at 2.
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to create a more transparent culture in the district attorney’s office by
redefining of the prosecutor’s prosecutorial power, re-characterizing the
relationship between prosecutors and defense attorneys, and reinforcing the
need for prosecutorial accountability.99 The focus is on mitigating racial
disparities, including restorative practices, and on committing prosecutors to
monitor their efforts to mitigate racial disparities on an ongoing basis.100
When read in their entirety, all the principles address the individual
contributors of the racially disproportionate outcomes in plea bargaining and
create a more equitable playing field when plea bargaining race.101 Yet,
specific principles are directly relevant to making plea bargaining race a fairer
and more just process. Foremost, progressive prosecutors are to address
racial disparities.102 Progressive prosecutors should charge with restraint and
plea bargain fairly so that the charge and concomitant punishment is
commensurate with other defendants who have committed similar crimes.103
When considering which defendants to charge, progressive prosecutors must
minimize misdemeanors to help minimize the systemic racist policing,104
treat Black children who are defendants as children to help cut off the school
to prison pipeline,105 and encourage the treatment, not criminalization, of
mental illness106 and drug addiction.107
When considering the appropriate case disposition, progressive
prosecutors are to promote restorative justice options where appropriate,108
and make diversion the rule.109 Such an expanded prosecutorial mindset
about appropriate justice outcomes will minimize the disproportionate
number of Black defendants incarcerated and punished without
rehabilitation.110 This restorative focus is also likely to minimize the
recidivism of formerly incarcerated defendants, because, as part of a
99. Id. at 19-20.
100. Id. at 15-16.
101. Id. Prosecutors can confront these issues in ways such as publicly committing to reducing
racial and ethnic disparities, promoting racial equity, and implicit bias training within their role in the
communities they serve. Id.
102. 21 Principles, supra note 97, at 15-16. Prosecutors can confront these issues in ways such as
publicly committing to reducing racial and ethnic disparities, promoting racial equity, and implicit bias
training within their role in the communities they serve. Id.
103. Id. at 5-6. Prosecutors should evaluate cases early to dismiss if they are weak, avoid the
maximum possible charge as a matter of course, refrain from withdrawing plea offers while defendants
wait to hear from a jury, and limit the use of sentencing enhancements. Id.
104. Id. at 10-11. Prosecutors should avoid charging misdemeanors associated with poverty, mental
illness, and homelessness, nor should they charge sex works or clients who are both 18 years of age and
consent, and they should develop cite and release programs to keep people out of jail. Id.
105. Id. at 9-10.
106. Id. at 7-8.
107. 21 Principles, supra note 97, at 8-9.
108. Id. at 12-13.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 27, note 9.
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restorative focus, the defendant will also receive necessary rehabilitation.111
Of significance, in the restorative process, the community and victim will
play a role in ensuring that the defendant is held accountable for their crimes
and that their community is kept safe.112
C. 55 Prosecutorial Performance Indicators113
Stated principles about a new justice paradigm to mitigate disparate
justice outcomes are just words unless prosecutors take affirmative steps to
follow through on these principles.114 Thus, FJP, in collaboration with
criminologists from Loyola University at Chicago and Florida International
University, has also created 55 Prosecutorial Performance Indicators.115 The
purpose of these performance indicators is to ensure that the articulated
aspirations and goals of each district attorney’s office are actually supported
by data.116 Included in these 55 items are indicators used to determine if
district attorneys are protecting and servicing victims and whether they are
allocating adequate time to achieve these priorities.117 As discussed, a more
thoughtful plea bargaining process takes more time than the traditional
courthouse in-the-corner-exchange-of-charges-and-sentences.118 Therefore,
the performance indicator is an accountability measure for progressive
prosecutors to synchronize their goals with their allocation of time and
resources.119
Restorative Justice Briefing Paper
The FJP briefing paper on Restorative Justice, part of FJP’s Issues at a
Glance series, educates interested prosecutors about how the restorative
justice approach provides an alternate lens in which to respond and provide
justice.120 The paper explains how prosecutors can collaborate with the
community to develop more responsive justice outcomes for the community,
the victim and the defendant and offers strategies for them to do so.121 This
111. 21 Principles, supra note 97, at 4.
112. Id. at 12.
113. See generally PROSECUTORIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, https://prosecutorialperformancei
ndicators.org (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
114. See FLA. INT’L U. & LOY. U. CHI., Implementation Guide for Prosecutorial Performance
Indicators (2020), https://ppibuild.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/2020-PPL-Implementatio
n-Guide-FINAL-with-links.pdf.
115. 21 Principles, supra note 97, at 12.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Greenberg, supra note 3, at 127-29.
119. 21 Principles, supra note 97, at 12.
120. Resources Issues at a Glance Briefs, FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION, https://fairandjustprosecutio
n.org/resources/issues-at-a-glance-briefs/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2021).
121. Id.
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paper is more than selling a pipe dream. Of significance, this paper provides
a national sampling of state models and legislation that have successfully
adopted a restorative justice approach.122
D. Progressive Prosecutors In Action
Progressive prosecutors are gaining national traction.123 State’s Attorney
Kim Foxx in Cook County, Illinois; District Attorney Larry Krasner in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Prosecuting Attorney Dan Satterberg in King
County Washington; State Attorney Monique Worrell in Orlando, Florida;
Gordon McLaughlin in Colorado’s Eighth Judicial District; District Attorney
Chesa Boudin in San Francisco; and District Attorney Eric Gonzalez in
Brooklyn, New York are among the increasing number of progressive
prosecutors who are implementing criminal justice reforms in their
jurisdictions.124
A Frontline eight-part documentary on the work of District Attorney
Larry Krasner in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania highlights the trials and
tribulations of being a progressive prosecutor.125 For example, Larry Krasner
was elected in 2017 in a landslide victory, promising to end mass
incarceration and to eradicate the systemic racial structure that perpetuated
mass incarceration.126 Yet, this same criminal justice reform stance that got
him elected, created antagonistic relationships with those he needed to work
with to implement such change such as within the police force.127
Additionally, it is important to note that the decision to elect a progressive
prosecutor is a politicized one128 and is less likely to take hold in small, insular
areas that prefer maintaining the status quo.129 Moreover, not all elected
122. Id.
123. Caren Morrison, Progressive Prosecutors Scored Big Wins 2020 Elections, Boosting A
Nationwide Trend, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 16, 2020, 8:22 AM), https://theconversation.com/progressi
ve-prosecutors-scored-big-wins-in-2020-elections-boosting-a-nationwide-trend-149322 (discussing how
the 2020 election showed a growing trend for “reform-minded prosecutors.”); Alison Young, The Facts
on Progressive Prosecutors, CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 19, 2020, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanpr
ogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2020/03/19/481939/progressive-prosecutors-reformingcriminal-justice/.
124. Morrison, supra note 123 (vowing to bring more accountability to police shootings, keep a
closer eye on police misconduct, address mass incarceration, including alternatives to incarceration, and
reduce the prosecutions for nonviolent crimes).
125. Ted Passon et al., Philly D.A., PBS: INDEPENDENT LENS (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/i
ndependentlens/documentaries/philly-da/.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Young, supra note 123 (discussing how the 2020 election showed a growing trend for “reformminded prosecutors.”).
129. Romero, supra note 10, at 815-16. Given that the decision to elect a progressive prosecutor is
a politicized one, a locality is less likely to be incentivized to elect a progressive prosecutor if most
residents are satisfied with the justice outcomes, prefer to maintain the status quo, and do not see a need
for a justice reformer. Id. at 817.
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progressive prosecutors are welcomed with open arms. For example, St.
Louis Missouri Prosecutor Kim Gardner has received resistance and push
back for her reform activism against police brutality.130
In their engagement with public defenders, progressive prosecutors are
creating a plea bargaining culture change.131 Through their activism, these
prosecutors are transforming their once highly adversarial relationship when
plea bargaining with public defenders into a more collaborative one.132
Public defenders are now having informed conversations with prosecutors
rather than just trading charges and sentencing numbers.133 Instead, the
conversations the attorneys are having during plea bargaining are more
productive conversations about responsive justice.134 This culture change is
resetting the plea bargaining table. Furthermore, those prosecutors who are
committing to adopt a restorative justice stance that involves community and
victims, are mobilizing community support and winning elections.135
E.

But . . .

Even though for many the status quo is unbearable, and the constructive
use of prosecutorial power is a welcome fix to an untenable situation, there
are still those doubters and naysayers who do not support the concept of
progressive prosecutors.136 Doubters point to the paucity of data about the
efficacy of progressive prosecutors and question the zealousness of those who
are jumping on the progressive prosecutorial bandwagon without that data.137
Also, there are naysayers who prefer an abolitionist approach rather than the

130. Bill Whitaker, Prosecutor Kim Gardner’s Fight to Reform the St. Louis Justice System, CBS
NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Mar. 14, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kim-gardner-st-louis-prosecutor-bla
ck-woman-60-minutes-2021-03-14/1.
131. Green & Bazelon, supra note 24 (describing the difference between traditional “law-and-order
prosecutors” and progressive prosecutors as a culture war).
132. Matt Watkins, Prosecutor Power #2 A Public Defender on the Urgency of Reform, CTR. CT.
INNOVATION (May 2018), https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/public-defender-power-prosecut
ors.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, at 2318 (listing a prosecutor’s community as a
stakeholder to a restorative approach to prosecution).
136. Romero, supra note 10, at 816.
137. See, e.g., Charles Stimson & Zack Smith, “Progressive” Prosecutors Sabotage the Rule of
Law, Raise Crime Rates, and Ignore Victims, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.heritage.org
/crime-and-justice/report/progressive-prosecutors-sabotage-the-rule-law-raise-crime-rates-and-ignore
(claiming data does not exist to support progressive prosecutors’ claims that traditional prosecutors are
ineffective in achieving justice); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice What Is It and Does It
Work?, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 11 (2007) (“There are . . . claims that restorative justice does not
meet its own claims.”).
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criminal justice reform approach of progressive prosecutors.138 Accordingly,
they believe the criminal justice system is so broken, it cannot be fixed.139
Still there are others, who believe that nothing is broken, and nothing
needs to be fixed.140 For example, more insular and conservative regions are
happy with the status quo, and consider racial justice to be less of a priority.141
The population of such communities might be less diverse, and the voices of
those suffering from racial disparate outcomes are less likely to be heard.142
Thus, in such intransient communities resistant to racial justice reform, the
incentives for change are weaker.143
Law schools must accept responsibility for maintaining the status quo
and resisting these criminal justice reforms.144 For example, many law
schools who have criminal justice clinics, structure the clinic selection so that
students can take either the criminal defense clinic or the prosecution
clinic.145 A more helpful pedagogical model would be one that requires those
students who are interested in criminal justice to take both clinics, so that
students develop a balanced perspective of the role of prosecutors and public
defenders.146 Education about restorative justice should be part of that
clinical experience.147 As part of a more realistic criminal justice experiential
learning, law schools should also teach students plea bargaining.148
Progressive prosecutors are reforming the criminal justice system and the
plea bargaining process. Next, public defenders should consider how they,
in the midst of this cultural reform, can enhance their plea bargaining race
skills to achieve more racially equitable outcomes.

138. See, e.g., The Paradox of Progressive Prosecution, 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 758-68 (2018)
(comparing reform to eating a piece of moldy bread and questioning whether it is a preferable alternative
to simply throwing it out) [hereinafter “The Paradox”].
139. Id. at 758-68.
140. Green & Bazelon, supra note 24, at 2299.
141. Romero, supra note 10, at 818 (describing the author’s discussion of race with other attorneys
in Utah).
142. Green & Bazelon, supra note 24, at 2308.
143. See Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 24, at 2318.
144. See Mariah Stewart, Law Schools Have Started a Criminal Justice Reform Movement, INSIGHT
INTO DIVERSITY (June 24, 2020), https://www.insightintodiversity.com/law-schools-have-started-a-crimi
nal-justice-reform-movement/ (“Mass incarceration, overworked public defenders, and a lack of
rehabilitation programs are . . . problems plaguing the nation’s criminal justice system. . . . Law schools
play a critical role in redressing such wrongs.”).
145. See Public Interest Clinics, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/grou
ps/center-pro-bono/resources/directory_of_law_school_public_interest_pro_bono_programs/defininions/
pi_pi_clinics/ (listing the different clinics offered by participating law schools).
146. See Stewart, supra note 144 (“Legal clinics are a ‘prime space’ for law schools to address
criminal justice reform because students can help people who might otherwise not get representation.”).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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IV.
PUBLIC DEFENDERS CAN ENHANCE PLEA BARGAINING RACE
SKILLS
This section will spotlight two recent articles about plea bargaining: The
Shadow Bargainers149 and Unshackling Plea Bargaining from Racial Bias150.
These articles provide an understanding of how public defenders plea bargain
race and what they can do to improve their plea bargaining skills.151
A. The Shadow Bargainers
This study shows that junior public defenders with less than eight years
of experience already approach plea bargaining with a restorative justice
mindset which the authors label “shadow of the client.”152 This study also
indicates that there is a need for public defenders to hone their plea bargaining
skills so that when they bargain for their client’s justice, their negotiation
strategies are consistent with advancing their client’s prioritized goals.153
The researchers sent a survey to 2,265 public defenders working in 21
offices across 13 states. They received responses from 579 attorneys.154 The
researchers then surveyed the responding public defenders about their
preparation for plea bargaining and the actual bargaining strategies they used
when plea bargaining with prosecutors.155 The study revealed two important
insights.156 First, junior public defenders with up to eight years of experience,
prepared for plea negotiation by bargaining in the “shadow of the client”
compared to more senior public defenders who prepared for plea bargaining
by bargaining in the “shadow of the trial.”157 Second, those attorneys who
reported to bargain in the “shadow of the client” did not follow through and
continued to prioritize their client’s concerns in the actual plea bargaining
process.158 Thus, there is a gap in how public defenders self-report and what
they actually do in plea bargaining.159
The researchers explained that public defenders prepare for plea
bargaining by comparing their possible negotiated outcome with one of two
world views: the “shadow of the trial” or the “shadow of the client”160 Their
study showed that more senior public defenders, those with more than eight
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Wright et al., supra note 30.
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 93.
See infra Part IV.A.-B.
Wright et al., supra note 39, at 48-49.
Id. at 20-22.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 27-28.
Wright et al., supra note 39, at 27-28.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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years of experience, prepare for plea bargaining by considering the strength
of their evidence and the likely adjudicated outcome if this case was not plea
bargained, but resolved by trial.161 It is likely that public defenders who
prepare for plea bargaining in the “shadow of trial,” find a more trial-centered
focus will be more aligned with negotiating with a prosecutor who shares a
retributive justice frame.162
In a different alignment, those public defenders who prepare for plea
bargaining in the “shadow of the client” category, are more likely to be
aligned with those prosecutors who are negotiating within a restorative
justice frame.163 Such public defenders bargaining in the “shadow of the
client” consider the client’s wants and needs, life circumstances, the client’s
pre-trial custody, the client’s “blameworthiness,” and other equitable factors
and any collateral consequences that may result from any conviction.164 All
these needs are more easily addressed within a restorative, rather than
retributive, justice framework.165
Interestingly, this study also cracked the stereotype about public
defenders being ineffective because of an overwhelming caseload.166 Some
of the public defenders minimized the effects of their caseloads on their plea
bargain preparation.167 Rather, public defenders reported that the size of their
caseload did not adversely impact their negotiation outcomes.168 The authors
of the study opined that the reason for this minimization is that public
defenders might regard the time needed to prepare for plea bargaining as
significantly less than preparing for trial.169
There are gaps between what public defenders do in plea bargaining and
how they self-report.170 For example, the public defenders surveyed voiced
the importance of a good reputation and a good relationship between
negotiating partners.171 Yet, in their surveys, they ranked interpersonal
relationships and reputation at the bottom of the important factors in a
negotiation.172 There were also other gaps in what public defenders said were
a part of good practice and in how they ranked the time spent in that
practice.173 For example, less time is spent on factual investigation of
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 26.
Wright et al., supra note 39, at 27.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 22-24.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 29.
Wright et al., supra note 39, at 32.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 36-39.
Id. at 31.
Wright et al., supra note 39, at 35.
Id. at 39-41.
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witnesses, site visits,174 and on legal research, especially in cases involving
misdemeanors where legal research may make a difference in the outcome.175
Furthermore, during the actual bargaining process itself, public defenders do
not engage in the strategic sharing of information, and often wait for the
prosecutor to make the first move.176 In fact, this is a lost opportunity for
public defenders who bargain in the “shadow of the client,” because they not
only withhold relevant information about their client, but they make offers
that were, for the most part, unfavorable for their client.177
The article also reported on how little time the public defenders reported
spending on plea bargaining a case including the time spent on bargaining
discussions and advising clients.178 For misdemeanors, public defenders
reported spending 20 minutes plea bargaining and 17 minutes advising the
client about the offer.179 To the horror of this author, the researchers
commented that they thought these estimates were inflated and that public
defenders actually spent less time on plea bargaining.180 When asked how
plea bargaining was conducted, public defenders ranked in order of use– in
person in courthouse, email, telephone, in person in office, text message,
letter via fax or postal service.181
Thus, the Shadow Bargainers identifies the more junior public defenders
as already having a restorative justice mindset, the “shadow of the client,”
when they prepare for plea bargaining.182 This mindset is aligned with those
of progressive prosecutors.183 However, once the actual bargaining begins,
the public defenders would benefit from additional negotiation training.184
For example, devoting adequate time and preparation for the negotiation,
appreciating the value of sharing information, becoming comfortable with
initiating the discussion and conducting the negotiation in person in a location
without distraction will help public defenders advance their clients’ interest
and plea bargain race more effectively.185

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 41.
Wright et al., supra note 39, at 42.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Wright et al., supra note 39, at 48.
See The Paradox, supra note 138, at 752.
Alkon & Schneider, supra note 39.
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 131-37.
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B. Unshackling Plea Bargaining from Racial Bias
Unshackling Plea Bargaining from Racial Bias ties together the social
activism of progressive prosecutors and the research about public defenders
and provides a road map that integrates the organizational values, structures,
procedures, and individual skills both public defenders and prosecutors need
to plea bargain race.186
First, the offices of public defenders and district attorneys need to make
equitable justice outcomes a stated priority.187 Flowing from that priority,
there needs to be an organizational and procedural alignment with that
goal.188 Each office should develop an operational plan delineating the steps
needed to achieve that goal.189 For example, office policies and procedures
need to be modified to ensure that attorneys have adequate time and support
to prepare for plea bargaining race.190 Time is needed to conduct a thorough
client interview, make a site visit, question witnesses and conduct adequate
legal research, beyond a cursory review of the file.191 Moreover, a data
collection process should be implemented to ensure that each office is
actually achieving their stated goal—minimizing disparate racial justice
outcomes.192 If needed, budgetary adjustments should be made to
accommodate these necessary programmatic changes.193
Both group and individual de-biasing training will help heighten legal
actors’ awareness of their own implicit biases about race and need to be part
of this commitment to mitigate racially disparate justice outcomes.194
Prosecutors and public defenders should hold joint office trainings on implicit
bias so that each side shares and appreciates the biases both hold.195 Joint debiasing training will also help to foster and strengthen the collaboration
necessary in a more problem-solving plea bargaining stance.196 Besides joint
training, individual lawyers should self-administer the IAT to reinforce their
own awareness of their own racial biases.197 With this self-awareness about
their own biases, prosecutors and public defenders can prepare for plea
bargaining race.198
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See generally id.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 132.
Id.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 132.
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 135.
Id.
Id. at 145
Id. at 142.
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An essential focus is to ensure that public defenders and district attorneys
hone their plea bargaining race skills. Prior to beginning plea bargaining race,
public defenders and district attorneys should complete a plea bargaining
worksheet.199 The preparation of the worksheet slows down the plea
bargaining preparation process and reminds attorneys of the important and
qualitative information they need before they actually begin bargaining—the
education, familial background and employment history of the individual,
including a photo;200 previous criminal history, disposition and overall
compliance with parole;201 a description of the alleged crime and witness
interviews; extenuating circumstances;202 political or social factors that
influence how the crime is perceived;203 self-awareness about the lawyer’s
own bias(es) about the individual or alleged crime;204 consideration of how
the other side will complete the worksheet;205 information you wish to get
from the other side during the bargaining;206 information you wish to convey
to the other side during the bargaining;207 and clarification about the client’s
prioritized interests.208
The preparation of the plea bargaining worksheet should not take place
in a vacuum. Rather, each office should create teams whose members are
resources for each other in plea bargaining preparation and provide a check
on any plea bargaining bias.209 Furthermore, offices should hold regular case
debriefs to ensure that plea bargaining race outcomes align with the stated
goals – minimizing racially disparate outcomes.210 If the plea bargaining race
outcomes still yield disparate justice outcomes, then the office needs to
rethink their process and take additional remedial measures that will yield
more equitable outcomes.211
Then, the public defender and prosecutor will be ready for the actual
bargaining.212 The meeting should take place in a setting where there are no
distractions so that the prosecutor and public defenders can focus on the
important task at hand, negotiating racial justice for this client.213 Throughout
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 142.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id.
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 143.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133.
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 133.
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 139.

626

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

the meeting each side will share information and maintain a collaborative
tenor—what is appropriate and responsive justice for this client given the
facts of this case.214 During this more client-focused discussion, the
prosecutor and public defender will have a restorative justice focus.215 This
broader focus will incentivize the prosecutor and public defender to consider
not only an appropriate punishment, but to also consider which rehabilitative
approach will help the defendant return to the community as a constructive,
contributing member.216 At the conclusion of the meeting, the public
defender will then meet with the client, present the plea bargain option,
counsel the client about any collateral consequences of accepting the plea and
help the client assess if the proposed plea bargain option advances the client’s
prioritized interests.217
One should note that this type of plea bargaining is deliberate, thoughtful,
and likely to minimize disparate racial justice outcomes in plea bargaining.218
As informed by cognitive behavioral the speed, lack of awareness and broad
discretion that allows implicit racial biases to influence decision making are
tempered by the slower pace, heightened awareness and alternate structure of
this type of plea bargain.219 Learning from negotiation theorists, both public
defenders and prosecutors spend meaningful time preparing for the plea
bargain.220 They appreciate that plea negotiations take time, and dedicate
adequate time for this process.221 During the bargaining process, they share
information about the client, the crime, and extenuating circumstances.222
They problem-solve to consider viable justice options. Both are never
forgetting an overriding justice goal—to ensure equitable justice for all.223
IN CONCLUSION, WE THROW OUT THE OLD STEREOTYPES AND
BEGIN A NEW NARRATIVE . . .

V.

It is fitting that this paper begins and ends with the quote from President
Obama. “Change will not come if we wait for some other person or some
other time. We are the ones we’ve been waiting for. We are the change that
we seek.”224 Some public defenders and progressive prosecutors have heeded

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 139-40.
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 139-40.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 139-40.
See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 137-40.
Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 137-40.
Id. at 141-42.
Obama, supra note 1.
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this message and are becoming agents of change for plea bargaining race.225
Significantly, they are changing the way they plea bargain race by adopting
a broader restorative justice approach where appropriate and honing their
negotiation skills.226
As with any culture change, a few lead the way before the mainstream
follows. How do we incentivize such criminal justice influencers like law
schools, politicians, and communities to maintain this reform momentum?
Public defenders and prosecutors committed to moving the justice reform
movement forward, should also take heed of the expressed concerns of the
naysayers.227
Presenting a greater challenge, public defenders and
prosecutors, as part of their plea bargaining race reform efforts, need to right
the wrongs done by past public defenders and prosecutors, so that going
forward, communities have greater trust in plea bargaining race, specifically,
and the criminal justice system as a whole.228
At this juncture in the plea bargaining reform efforts, there is value in
telling a more truthful narrative about public defenders and prosecutors.229
That narrative both captures the reform efforts that are making a difference
without ever losing sight of the deleterious wrongs of maintaining the plea
bargaining status quo.230 For, it is those past wrongs that guide and educate
reformers about the reforms that are needed in this new plea bargaining race
process and the safeguards that need to be implemented to ensure that plea
bargaining race never reverts back to the status quo.231 That more truthful
narrative is an important marker that tells us where we are, where we’ve been,
and where we still need to go.
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